The welfare effects of nationalization in a mixed duopoly public transport market by Qin, Feifei et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
The Welfare Effects of Nationalization in a Mixed Duopoly Public 
Transport Market 
 
ABSTRACT 
Recently, many cities have launched new rail transit lines. Once these new rail transit lines 
start commercial operation, they will play important roles as competitors to conventional bus 
services. In this paper, the effects of nationalization on equilibria have been studied in a mixed 
duopoly public transport market, in which one publicly-owned rail transit operator competes with 
one private bus operator. Two numerical case studies show the nationalization of a rail transit 
company is always socially desirable both in Bertrand pricing game in the short run and in Nash 
Non-cooperative game in the long run.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s, in parallel with the trend towards deregulation and privatization, the 
organizations of public transport in many cities have been undergoing a radical transformation. In 
the bus market, it exhibits a transition from a state-owned monopolistic form to a private 
competition regime. Under franchise agreements, private bus companies can freely provide local 
services to residents. Whereas, due to the huge capital requirement and substantial economies of 
scale, most rail transit systems around the world are typically operated by state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). However, since the 2000s, in order to transform SOEs from cost centers to economic 
entities responsible for certain profit targets, transit authorities have begun to restructure these 
SOEs into limited liability companies or joint stock companies, which can be termed as 
"corporatization" or "partial privatization”. Consequently, the prevailing organization in urban 
public transport market presents such a structure that one (semi-) public rail transit operator 
competes with one or several private bus companies, which suggests the presence of a mixed 
oligopoly.1 As an example, Shanghai-one of the largest cities in China, has more than 1000 bus 
lines, served by more than 10 private bus companies. However, all rail transit lines are only 
operated by one company—Shengtong Metro Company, which was originally a complete public 
entity. While, in 2000, it reformed as a semi-public cooperation with 63.65% of its share holding 
by Shanghai municipality. Mixed oligopolies are also common in developing countries' cities (such 
as Santiago in Chile, Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia), in which multiple operators with different 
ownership are vying for passengers. In a mixed oligopoly, the operational strategies chosen by 
public and private operators may differ due to their respective organisational objectives. As a result 
of changes in the transport market, pertinent questions emerge: if one rail transit operator chooses 
to partially maximize consumer surplus rather than to solely maximize its own profit, how will this 
change affect equilibria and, most importantly, could it really contribute to increasing social 
welfare as its organisational objective concerns? 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some related literature is briefly 
reviewed to shed light on the contributions made by this paper. Section 3 provides one Nash non-
cooperative game in a mixed duopoly public transport market. In Section 4, to evaluate the effects 
of nationalization on equilibrium results, two numerical cases for short-run and long-run 
competitions are conducted by using Suzhou traffic data. Main findings and recommendations for 
further research are reported in Section 5.  
 
                                                          
1 In the field of industrial economics, mixed oligopoly refers to the competition between public firms, which are 
instructed to maximize their contributions to welfare, and profit-maximization private companies. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper builds upon two strands of literature. The first strand is the application of non-
cooperative game theory in the field of transport analysis. The second strand consists of studies on 
mixed oligopoly in the field of industrial organization. 
Regarding modelling strategic competitions in transport market, the non-cooperative game 
theory is firstly applied as the Cournot monopoly model. Viewed as a cornerstone, Viton (1981) 
first started to consider Cournot competition in a purely private duopoly market with service quality 
and fare as controlled variables. After observing changes in the British bus market, Oldfield and 
Emmerson (1986) also modelled a Cournot-quality competition between two private bus operators 
to explain their price setting should follow changes in public transport organization. In the case of 
one public transport line operated by an arbitrary number of operators, Williams and Abdulaal 
(1993) employed a Logit model to derive mathematical expressions for equilibrium fares and 
frequencies. In addition to these pioneering studies on Cournot quantity competition, strategic 
interactions between transport operators were also modelled as Bertrand oligopoly (Vives, 1999). 
Braid (1986) adopted a game-theoretical approach to model a Bertrand pricing competition 
between two congested facilities. Else and James (1995) investigated a private duopoly competition 
over price and service quality in the rail transit sector. Afterwards, studies on modelling public 
transport competition with Bertrand-like models have intensified (e.g., De Palma and Leruth, 1989; 
Wang and Yang, 2005; Wichiensin et al., 2007; Yang and Woo, 2000).  
These studies provide considerable insights into inter-modal and/or intra-modal competitions. 
However, most studies have only focused on the pure oligopoly market in which each operator 
concentrates on maximizing its own profits. Actually, the coexistence of one public firm and 
several private firms with distinct objective functions is prevalent both in developing countries and 
in developed countries. For example, the transit authority of Antwerp recently launched a proposal 
to build a private tunnel under the Scheldt River to relieve congestion on an existing publicly--
owned Kennedy tunnel (Proost et al., 2005). The mixed oligopoly competition can also be observed 
in the long-distance passenger transport services, in which one state-owned rail company and 
several private coach companies compete alongside one another. Another real world case is in the 
metropolis of Chicago, where the local aviation authority decides to privatize Midway airport, 
while leaving O’Hare airport in public ownership (Noruzoliaee et al., 2015).  
Although a larger body of literature has been produced to model strategic interactions within 
private oligopoly market, only a few studies have been carried out to study the mixed oligopoly 
competition in transport sector. For the seaport industry, Czerny et al. (2014) explored the effect 
of privatization on port for a local market. Matsushima and Takauchi (2014) investigated how port 
privatization affects port charges, profits and welfare elements from an international perspective. 
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In the context of aviation sector, Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Mantin (2012) 
investigated behavioral patterns of airports for international air transport markets, where one 
domestic publicly-owned airport competes against one private airport in another country. In 
addition to these intra-mode competition models, Yang and Zhang (2012) investigated the effect 
of inter-modal competition between air transport and high speed rail (HSR) in a mixed duopoly 
framework. Very recently, D’Alfonso et al. (2014) analyzed the impacts of competition between 
one private airline and one public HSR on the environment and social welfare. In the field of urban 
transport market, Cantos-Sanchez and Colonques (2006) explored frequency and pricing 
competition between one private bus and one public rail transit using a quadratic address model. 
Employing a quadratic utility function, Clark et al. (2009) compared equilibrium results that arise 
from collusion, applying Cournot and Bertrand competitions for a mixed duopoly bus market2. The 
above studies only focus on full nationalization. In reality, however, the markets are likely to have 
partially nationalized transport operators, especially in the urban transport market. For example, in 
China, Hangzhou government holds 51% of the share in Hangzhou Metro Company; the 
Norwegian Transit Authority holds the majority of shares in 36 bus companies. Despite these 
prevailing real world cases, the implications of partial privatization for frequency and pricing 
choices have not been investigated in the transport sector. Our research intends to fill in this gap. 
Dating back to the 1960s, Merrill and Schneider (1966) first observed the coexistence of one 
public firm and several private firms is prevalent in a diverse range of industries, such as 
telecommunications, energy and banking. They defined this market structure as "mixed 
oligopoly"(MO). Since then, theoretical analysis of mixed oligopoly has received considerable 
attentions. Most studies are concerned with whether a public firm should be privatized in the face 
of competitions from private firms. The evidence suggests that in the context of a quantity-setting 
oligopoly, nationalization will improve social welfare if there are relatively few private firms, but 
will lower welfare if there are a high number of private firms (De Fraja and Delbono, 1989, 1990; 
Anderson et al., 1997; Matsumura, 1998; Ishibashi and Matsumura, 2006). Most of the literature 
has assumed Cournot competition within a homogeneous market, only little attention has been paid 
to differentiated Bertrant model. There are a small number of exceptions to this. Cremer et al. (1991) 
examined the strategic behaviors of firms in choosing location and price in a horizontally 
differentiated mixed oligopoly market. Another recent example with product differentiation is a 
study by Fujiwara (2007) that assessed the welfare implications of partial privatization.           
                                                          
2 An important feature of our study which is distinct from Clark et al. (2009) is that the bus and rail transit operators 
compete in price and frequency with asymmetric goal functions, rather than competing in quantity or price with 
identical objective functions. 
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The review of relevant literature has made clear that all previous studies on MO employed 
simple linear demand functions, which can easily obtain analytical solutions. But, when exploring 
price competition among firms, an attraction model with nonlinear form is superior to linear one 
since it can not only represent reality more closely but also can reflect the nonlinear effects arising 
in competitive phenomena (Huang et al., 2012). Because of these advantages, we adopt a non-
linear demand function (that is, a Logit model) in this paper to obtain more general and practical 
conclusions. Moreover, most of above studies in mixed oligopoly assumed the aggregate demand 
for whole market is inelastic with respect to fare or full cost. Actually, this is a very strict 
assumption. In this paper, a more realistic case will be developed in which total local transport 
demand is elastic with respect to the combination of fare and frequency. 
The contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: (i) given the growing 
importance of partial nationalization in the transport sector, this paper fills the research gap by 
analyzing the effects of partially nationalizing a rail transit company that competes with a private 
bus service. (ii) in contrast to most mixed oligopoly studies with linear demand function, we 
employed an attraction demand function with non-linear form to provide more practical and general 
insights; (iii) Supplemented with a Chinese case study, two time horizons are analyzed for this 
vertically and horizontally differentiated mixed duopoly competition: a short time horizon in which 
operators compete only in fares, and a long time horizon in which they compete in frequency along 
with the price.  
3 MODELING FRAMEWORK 
3.1 Basic setting of Nash Non-Cooperative game  
This study focuses on a mixed duopoly public transport market, in which one semi-public rail 
transit operator (which is fully or partially concerned with users’ benefits) competes with a private 
bus company (which only consider its own profits). Since each player is trying to "optimize its 
objective function without prior knowledge of other players’ functions" (Evans, 1992), these two 
players make their decisions simultaneously without any collusion and receive payoffs depending 
on the service levels they offer. In this setting, one Nash Non-cooperation Game in the context of 
mixed duopoly has the following features:  
1) Players. Nowadays, although multiple private bus companies prevail in some cities, few 
overlapping operating situations lead us to view them as one virtual operator. Thus, we theoretically 
assume only one bus operator competes with one (semi-) public rail transit operator on an isolated 
route during a given period.  
2) Strategies. In the field of transport modelling, the strategic interaction occurs either in the 
price dimension (Bertrand) or in the quantity dimension (Cournot). What type of competition is 
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appropriate not only depends on the strategic variables employed but also largely depends on the 
production technology and the time horizon (Krepsand Scheinkman, 1983). Cournot competition 
may be applicable when the capacity is difficult to adjust (e.g. rail, airport) and productions are 
perceived as perfect substitutes. But, when capacities are flexible (e.g. bus) and products are more 
differentiated, a Bertrand competition would be more appropriate (Quinet and Vickerman, 2004). 
In the case of a competition between bus and rail transit, it is not evident which type of competition 
is more proper based on the ease or difficulty of capacity adjustment. Whereas, bus and rail services 
are not only horizontally differentiated in terms of their distinct mode features but also vertically 
differentiated in terms of different service qualities. This implies that the substitution between these 
two modes is imperfect and the products are differentiated. As a result, we believe a differentiated 
Bertrand competition may be reasonable for the short run competition. 
Besides price and quantity, frequency is another important strategic device. In the short run, 
since the increasing number of departures could require additional fleets, frequency is difficult to 
change. Thus, operators only compete over price, assuming frequency is exogenously given. 
Whereas, in the long run, operators may compete over frequency along side with fare since 
operators can relocate stops and buying more fleet.  
3) Payoff: In the field of mixed oligopoly, the conventional objective function of one public 
company is to maximize social welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus, its own profit and 
the profits of private companies. However, in the context of competition, it is somewhat 
unreasonable to assume the rail transit company competes against one bus company while also 
needs to consider its rival’s profit. Therefore, we assume, in addition to the rail company's profit, 
the rail company takes consumers’ interests into account when it decides fare and frequency. The 
profit of the bus company is out of its consideration. This kind of treatment is adopted by much 
recent literature (Clark et al., 2009; Jørgensen and Santos, 2014). While, as usual, it is reasonable 
to assume one private bus company is only concerned with maximizing its profit. 
3.2 Demand functions and operating cost  
In view of the mixed duopoly competition between one public rail transit operator and one 
private bus operator, this sub-section begins by constructing a demand function for operator i 
(Hereafter, the subscript r will be used to denote rail transit and the subscript b for bus), which 
conventionally takes the following form: 
                         { }* , ,i iQ Q cc M i b rξ= =                  (1)                                     
Where, Qi is the number of passengers selecting public transport service i. Q*{ξ, cc} 
represents total traffic demand of public transport sector, which is the function of composite costs 
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(cc) and one positive parameter ξ (ξ >0). Mi denotes the market share of public transport service 
afforded by operator i.   
The total demand for local public transport is supposed to be an exponential function of 
composite costs (cc)3:   
                     [ ]* * exp ( )Q Q cc ccξ= − −                                   (2) 
The composite cost (cc) represents the expected disutility of using public transport modes. A 
bar over a variable denotes its value in a reference case before competition takes place. Thus, Q�∗is 
the initial total public transport demand in a benchmark situation and cc means the composite cost 
of reference case. Total demand for local public transport is elastic, because any changes in 
composite cost will shift the travelling demand between public transport modes and private 
transport modes (such as private cars, motorbikes, etc.).   
To reflect the elastic of total demand change with respect to travellers’ composite costs, we 
further specify the formulation of composite costs as:  
                      𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 = − 1
𝜃𝜃
ln∑ exp (−𝜃𝜃𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖)                             (3) 
Where Ci denotes the generalized cost of travelling by public transport mode i. θ  is a positive 
dispersion parameter. In this paper, individual travellers’ mode choices are assumed to be based on 
minimizing their generalized cost per trip (Ci), which equals the sum of the monetary cost (fare) 
and the travel time weighted by value of time.  
                         1 2 (1 2 )i i i iC P T fα ρ α ρ= + +                           (4)                                                           
Where Pi is the fare charged by public transport operator i. Ti is the average in-vehicle 
travelling time using public transport service i, which can be computed based on travelling distance 
and speed. Normally, during rush hour, the public transport services are much more frequent. Thus, 
the average waiting time can be roughly estimated from one-half the inverse of frequency (fi). ρ is 
the value of time (VOT). 1α  and 2α  are parameters that measure different weights that 
passengers put on in-vehicle travelling time and waiting time. To focus on the principal aspects, 
this paper confines itself to the case of one homogeneous passenger group, which indicates all 
passengers are identical in regard to the value of time. Furthermore, for both bus and rail transit 
services, since the station location and number of stops have been decided in the planning stage, 
accessing time costs have not been included in the generalized cost function. 
                                                          
3 With this exponential function, the elasticity of total public transport demand will be proportional to composite cost 
( ( )* *( ) ( )cc Q cc cc Q ccε ξ= ∂ ∂ = − ) .This is a property of public transport demand which has been found in many studies 
(See Johansen, 2001; Fearnley, et al., 2004). 
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Turning to the specifications of travelling mode choices, the market share of operator i is given 
by the Binary Logit form: 
exp( )
exp( )
i
i
i
i
CM
C
θ
θ
−
=
−∑                              (5)  
Inserting Equations (5), (2) and (3) into Equation (1), after some manipulation, the number of 
passengers that choose public transport service i is: 
        ( ) ( ) ( )
1
* exp exp expi i i i
i i
Q Q C C C
ξ ξ
θ θ
θ θ θ
− −
   
= − − −   
   
∑ ∑                (6) 
Where 𝐶𝐶?̅?𝑖 denotes the generalized cost of mode i in reference case. To show the impact of 
price and frequency on travel demand, we partially differentiate Equation (6) and obtain the 
following results: 
( ) { }0 , ,i i i j
i
Q Q M M i j b r i j
P
ξ θ
∂
= − + < ∈ ≠
∂
               (7) 
( ) 0i i j
j
Q Q M
P
θ ξ
∂
= − >
∂
                                            (8) 
2
2 ( ) 02
i
i i j
i i
Q Q M M
f f
α ρ ξ θ
∂
= + >
∂
                                     (9) 
2
2( ) 02
i
i j
j j
Q Q M
f f
α ρ
ξ θ
∂
= − <
∂
                                       (10) 
Various empirical studies proved that (θ-ξ )>0 in the urban public transport market. From the 
above equations, it is clear that a high fare of one public transport service will reduce its own 
demand and increase the demand of its competitor. Whereas, the increase of frequency will boost 
its own demand rate and simultaneously reduce the demand of its competitor. 
The variable operating costs of public transport service i (OCi) is the sum of marginal 
passenger cost (ci0) plus the variable cost (ci1) associated with service frequencies: 
                                 0 1i i i i iOC c Q c f= +                          (11)                                                                              
3.3 Price competition in the short run  
In a mixed oligopoly market, the bus operator is viewed as a pure commercially oriented 
company, which is only concerned with maximizing own profit. The profit of private bus company 
(πb) is defined as the fare-box revenue minus the costs associated with bus operation (OCb): 
                        bbbbb OCQPOF −==π                                (12) 
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As mentioned earlier, the public rail transit operator maximizes a weighted combination of its 
profit and consumer surplus of whole public transport market. Given the proposed exponential 
demand function, the explicit form of consumer surplus can be simply expressed as:   
                             *CS Q ξ=                                     (13) 
This simple expression for consumer surplus was derived by Evans (1992), and has since been 
used extensively by many studies (Williams and Abdulaal, 1993; Wichiensin et al., 2007). The 
parameter ξ can be interpreted from two perspectives. Firstly, ξ quantifies the sensitivity of the total 
local transport demand with respect to composite costs. The second interpretation is that the inverse 
of ξ is the average perceived benefit experienced by one representative traveler. Accordingly, the 
rail operator’s objective function can be specified as:  
*( ) ( )r r r r rOF CS Q PQ OCσ π σ ξ= + = + −                      (14)                                                                    
The continuous parameter σ, which ranges from 0 and 1, can be referred as the “weight” 
attached to consumer surplus. It gives a measurement of nationalization degree. σ=0 signifies the 
rail company is solely concerned with its profits. As σ rises, the weight on consumer surplus 
becomes heavier in rail transit firm’s objective function. When σ=1, the rail transit operator is fully 
nationalized and aims to maximize the sum of consumer surplus and its own profit.  
In this mixed duopoly market, each operator attempt to maximize its distinct objective 
function with respect to strategic valuables, subject to capacity constraint. 
                            ,
. .
i i
iP f
i i i
Max OF
s t Q K f≤
                                   (15) 
Ki is the designed vehicle capacity of public transport services i.  
In the short run, since the expansion of rolling stocks is strongly limited, the service frequency 
is assumed to be exogenously given. To this end, competition between two public transport modes 
is in price only.  
By setting the partial derivatives of payoff functions with respect to fare equal to zero, and 
performing some manipulation, Nash equilibrium prices ( 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ; the superscript NE denotes 
equilibrium) for operator i is given as (Details of the derivation can be referred to Appendix 1):  
                  ( ) 0
1NE
i i
j i
P c
M M
σ δ
θ ξ
−
= +
+
                                 (16) 
The indicator variable δ takes on the value of one for rail transit and 0 for bus.  
Next, we further partially differentiate Equation (16) with respect to its rival’s price (Pj) 
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                   ( )( )
2
1
NE
i i
j j
i j j
OF P M M
P P P
θ ξ
∂ ∂
= = − −
∂ ∂ ∂
                              (17) 
A closer look at the above mathematical expressions for equilibrium fares gives rise to some 
interesting insights. Firstly, in the absence of capacity constraints, the equilibrium price is equal to 
marginal passenger cost of public transport service i (ci0) plus a mark-up, which relates to the 
market share of public transport services. Secondly, when 1σ = (that is, the public rail transit 
company considers whole consumer surplus), the rail company consequently sets its fare equal to 
marginal cost (ci0). Finally, since various empirical studies proved that (θ-ξ)>0 in urban public 
transport market, we have𝜕𝜕2𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 ∂𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖⁄ 𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 > 0 , which implies one operator’s marginal profit 
increases as its competitor’s fare increase. That is, the price set by the bus company decrease 
(increase) in response to the price reduction (increase) of the rail transit company (𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ∂𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗� > 0). 
This property matches the well-known definition of the strategic complement in oligopolies. 
To test the effect of partial nationalization (σ) on equilibrium fares, we invoke the techniques 
of monotone comparative statics for the following analytical derivations and obtain: 
                   
2
2 2
( ) 0
NE
r r r
r r
dP OF P
d OF P
σ σ
σ
∂ ∂ ∂
= − <
∂ ∂
                              (18) 
From Equation (18)，it is clear that with an increase of σ, the equilibrium price falls for rail 
transit. The explanation could be, an increase in σ provides more incentives to rail transit company 
to reduce its fare for improving consumer surplus. Furthermore, since the equilibrium fares 
between bus and rail transit are strategic complements, the bus fare correspondingly falls to 
compete for passengers. So we can conclude in the mixed duopoly market, as the publicly-owned 
rail transit operator pays more attention to consumer surplus relative to its own profit, both 
equilibrium fares of bus and rail transit decreases.    
3.3 Frequency-price competition in the long run  
In the long run, since the frequency can be easily adjusted, it is reasonably assumed that public 
transport operators compete in both price and frequency. To derive the reaction functions for 
service frequency, a similar procedure is made by partially differentiating the payoff function of 
operator i with respect to its frequency. After some algebraic manipulation, the equilibrium service 
frequency is given as (Details of the derivation can be referred to Appendix 1 ): 
                      2
12
NE
i i
i
f Q
c
α ρ
=                                (19) 
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Obviously, the Nash Equilibrium frequency also follows the “square root formula". By 
analogy, the mathematical expression of equilibrium frequency can be further differentiated with 
respect to the frequency of its competitor:
 
                            
1
2 2
1
1
2 2
NE
i i
i
j i j
f QQ
f c f
α ρ −∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂
                          (20) 
From Equation (10), we have 𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗 < 0⁄ . Hence, the above equation takes a negative sign, 
which indicates a marginal increase (decrease) in the frequency of rail transit causes the bus 
operator to decrease (increase) its service frequency. It is worth noting that the conventional 
concept of strategic substitution can be appropriately employed to describe the relationship of 
equilibrium frequencies between bus and rail transit in this mixed oligopoly model4.  
Summarizing the above analysis, we obtain Proposition 1:   
Proposition 1: In the mixed duopoly market involving one private bus operator and one public rail 
transit company, Nash Equilibrium fares are strategic complements. While, Nash Equilibrium 
frequencies are strategic substitutes. 
Next, we investigate the impact of nationalization degree on equilibrium frequency. Given the 
mathematical specification of equilibrium frequency for rail transit in Equation (20), we partially 
differentiate it with respect toσ:  
            ( )
1
2 2
1
1
2 2
NE NE NE
NEr r r
r NE
i r
f Q PQ
c P
α ρ
σ σ
−∂ ∂ ∂
=
∂ ∂ ∂
                            (21) 
From Equations (7) and (21), we have 0NE NEr rQ P∂ ∂ <  and 0NErP σ∂ ∂ < , thus we can confirm 
0NErf σ∂ ∂ > . This means the equilibrium frequency of rail transit increases when rail operator 
places more weight on consumer surplus. Since the equilibrium frequencies between bus and rail 
are strategic substitutes, an increase in σ will decrease the equilibrium frequency for bus (𝑓𝑓𝑏𝑏𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ).  
Proposition 2 summarizes the impact of nationalization degree (σ) on equilibrium fares and 
service frequencies. 
                                                          
4 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the equilibrium result of Cournot competition is equivalent to the outcome 
of a two-stage game, where there is a simultaneous capacity choice after which price competition occurs (Kreps and 
Scheinkman, 1983). In the mixed monopoly, this equivalence found by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) is still valid, if 
assumptions of L-shaped marginal cost function and efficient rationing rule hold (A technical proof is available upon 
request from the authors). However, if two assumptions are violated, the K- S result might not remain valid. Extending 
the analysis to compare the equilibrium results of Cournot competition with outcomes of two-stage game would be a 
useful future study, if the demand function can be explicitly converted to inverse demand function. 
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Proposition 2: In line with the initial objective of increasing consumer surplus, a lower degree of 
nationalization leads to (i) lower equilibrium fares for both rail transit and bus; (ii) higher 
equilibrium frequency for rail transit and lower equilibrium frequency of bus.  
Next, we analyze how the change of nationalization degree affects passenger demand, 
consumer surplus and producer surplus. All results are summarized in the following propositions. 
Proposition 3: An increase in the level of nationalization (i) increases the total demand of local 
public transport in the equilibrium ( * 0NEQ σ∂ ∂ > ); (ii) increases the ridership of rail transit under 
the equilibrium, but reduces the ridership for bus, 0NErQ σ∂ ∂ >  and 0NEbQ σ∂ ∂ < . 
Proof: See the Appendix 3 
The insights behind Proposition 3 are as follows: When the rail operator attaches a high weight 
to consumer surplus and a correspondingly low weight to its profit, this welfare concern puts a 
downward pressure on rail fare and an upward incentive on raising rail frequency. The combination 
of lower fare and higher frequency makes rail transit services more attractive than before. Thus, its 
ridership is boosted along with its strengthened market share. However, only concerning its profit, 
the bus service becomes progressively less attractive, although it also reduces its fares to compete 
against rail transit. 
Proposition 4: Since travellers pay less in the move from a standard duopoly (SD) to a mixed 
duopoly (MD), the consumer surplus necessarily rises alongside the boost in total public transport 
demand. At the same time, there is a reduction in producer surplus when we move away from a 
standard private duopoly (SD) to a mixed duopoly (MD). 
Proof: See the Appendix 4 
Whilst the effects of nationalization on consumer surplus and producer surplus are 
straightforward now, we are not certain whether the increase in consumer surplus can compensate 
for the loss of producer surplus as the rail transit operator puts more weight on consumer surplus. 
Therefore, the impact of nationalization on social welfare is still ambiguous. So we turn to a 
numerical study based primarily on a mixed public transport market in a Chinese city. 
4 NUMERICAL CASE STUDIES 
To shed light on the impacts of partial nationalization on equilibrium outputs under a mixed 
duopoly market, this section begins with introducing Bertrand pricing game in Case 1, in which 
service frequency is less flexible in the short run. In Case 2, adding frequency as another strategic 
device, we illustrate the long-run impact of nationalization on Nash equilibrium solutions. To 
establish orders of magnitude for key strategic variables and associated welfare elements, Suzhou 
traffic data are used to gauge the results. Table 1 summarizes all traffic data and parameters used. 
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Table 1: Traffic Data and Parameters 
Description Measurement Rail Transit Bus 
Average running speed (Vi) Km/hour 40 20 
In-vehicle travelling time (Ti) Hour 0.225 0.45 
Vehicle capacity (Kmi) Passenger/vehicle 960 102 
Variable running costs (ci1) CNY/vehicle-km 22 8.9 
Marginal passenger cost (cio) CNY/passenger 0.002 0.0015 
Fare (Pi0)                                                CNY 3 1.5 
Frequency (fi) Vehicle/hour 12 8 
Market share (Mi0 ) Percent (%) 84.46% 15.54% 
Patronage of service i (Qi0) Passengers/hour 4,223 777 
Total public transport demand (Q�∗) Passengers/hour 5,000 
Value of time (ρ) CNY/hour 10.1 
Scale parameter (θ)  1 
Weights of in-vehicle time (α1)
   1 
Weights of waiting time (α2)  2 
Parameter in total transit demand (ξ)  0.2 
In the following numerical calculations, the traffic data and parameters, such as average fares, 
general operating characteristics of public transport, and value of time (VOT), were sourced from 
the Annual Report of Suzhou Urban Transportation (2008). Furthermore, concerning operating 
costs of bus, the information stems from Suzhou Bus Group Annual Report (2008). This report 
illustrates the variable operating costs of running an extra bus kilometre are 8.9 CNY and the 
marginal cost per passenger journey 0.0015 CNY. In terms of rail transit, the figures of variable 
operating costs (22 CNY per kilometre and 0.002 CNY per passenger) are estimated by referring 
to the accounting report of Suzhou Metro Company. Hong and Zuo (2006) estimated the sensitivity 
of transit passengers to changes of traveling costs in several Chinese cities. The results indicate 
that for a 1% reduction in traveling costs, there is a 0.1%-0.4 % increase in public transport 
patronage. In order to make the following cases more illustrative, operational status is also listed 
in Table 1. Setting the current situation as a reference case, we can compare how fares, frequencies, 
market shares, social welfare and its constituent parts change with the degree of nationalization. 
With 5,000 commuters per morning peak hour, the rail transit line catches a significantly larger 
market share (84.46%) than the bus (15.54%).  
 
4.1 Case one: the effect of nationalization (σ) on equilibra in the short run 
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In the short run, public transport operators cannot afford more frequent services due to the 
additional cost of increasing their fleet. Thus, both operators compete purely on price, assuming 
service frequencies are exogenously given. In Case one, to assess the impact of the level of 
nationalization (σ) on equilibrium configurations, the analysis begins with the move from standard 
private duopoly (SD, σ=0) to a mixed duopoly (MD, σ>0) case. As mentioned earlier, the 
parameter--σ, is continuous. But for the sake of exposition, in Table 2 and 3, we only list numerical 
equilibrium solutions with σ varying in steps of 0.2. 
The first two rows of Table 2 show that, as expected, the equilibrium prices of bus and rail 
transit decrease when rail operator places more weight on consumer surplus. Thus, for different 
values of σ, the pair of equilibrium fares are highest in standard private duopoly with 1.219 CNY 
for bus and 2.643 CNY for rail transit, and lowest in the mixed duopoly situation (σ=1) with only 
1.021 CNY for bus and 0.002 CNY for rail transit. Moreover, the synchronous decrease in bus and 
rail transit fares indicates the prices are strategic complements, which means the prices set by bus 
company decrease in response to the price reduction of Rail Company. Although both equilibrium 
fares move in the same direction (downward), the rate of decrease of rail transit fare is much greater. 
When the nationalization degree exceeds 0.8, rail transit has a competitive advantage over bus in 
terms of its relatively low fare.  
Table 2: Effect of Nationalization (σ) on Equilibrium Solutions in the short run 
 σ=0 σ=0.2 σ=0.4 σ=0.6 σ=0.8 σ=1 
Bus fare （Pb） 1.219 1.17 1.124 1.081 1.046 1.021 
Rail transit Fare （Pr） 2.643 2.326 1.945 1.463 0.828 0.002 
Market share of bus (Mb) 21.98% 17.73% 13.36% 9.04% 5.17% 2.39% 
Market share of rail transit (Mr ) 78.02% 82.27% 86.64% 90.96% 94.83% 97.61% 
Total public transport Demand (Q*) 5458 5754 6145 6701 7546 8850 
Passenger demand of bus (Qb) 1200 1020 821 606 390 211 
Passenger demand of rail transit (Qr) 4258 4734 5324 6095 7156 8639 
Producer Surplus (PS) 10053 9499 8573 6869 3623 -2477 
Δ Profit of bus (πb) 1184 875 605 338 91 -101 
     Δ Profit of rail transit ( πr) 8869 8624 7968 6531 3532 -2376 
Consumer Surplus (CS) 27289 28768 30726 33505 37732 44250 
Social Welfare (SW) 37742 38267 39299 40374 41355 41773 
   Note: PS is the producer surplus, which is the sum of bus’s profit (πb) and rail’s profit (πr).  
    SW is the social welfare, which is the sum of producer surplus (PS) and consumer surplus (CS) 
From Figure 1-a, it can be observed that the total demand of local public transport (Q*) and 
rail transit (Qr) increase gradually with the increase in σ. On the contrary, since rail transit attracts 
increasing numbers of travellers from buses due to its relatively low generalized cost, the market 
share of the bus quickly shrinks from 21.98% to 2.39%. The logic behind the result can be 
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explained as follows. The overall impact of nationalization on patronage is the combination of two 
effects: the first is increasing total demand for public transport, and the second is the shifting of 
market share between modes. Regarding rail transit, the more weight the rail transit firm places on 
consumer surplus, the greater the aggregate demand and rail operator's market share will be. 
Conversely, since the decreasing market share dominates the increase of total public transport 
demand, the equilibrium patronage of bus falls with the increasing degree of nationalization. 
Consequently, a further decrease in both firms’ prices triggered by nationalization boosts the total 
public transport demand. In such a case, the rail transit significantly erodes the market share of bus 
and the bus operator gradually loses its competitive advantage.  
 
Figure 1: The impacts of partial nationalization on equlibria in short run  
As illustrated in Figure 1-b, although the ridership of rail transit rises, the sharp reduction in 
fares cause the rail transit operator's profits to rapidly tail off. Due to the rail transit operator's 
relatively high operating cost, the low fare revenue cannot cover its variable operating costs when 
the degree of nationalization exceeds 0.9. When σ reaches 1, it would be difficult for rail transit 
operator to remain profitable, the rail transit operator would require subsidies from local 
government. On the contrary, although the combined effect of fare reduction and shrinking 
ridership results in a considerable decrease in the profits of the bus, the relatively lower operating 
cost makes the bus operator profitable when the value of σ does not exceed 0.9. In the extreme case 
of the rail transit operator fully considering consumer surplus (σ=1), the bus operator cannot break 
even. As the profit is squeezed, the bus operator might drop out of business. 
In the mixed duopoly, lower equilibrium prices and higher total transit demand have positive 
impacts on consumer surplus, implying consumer surplus rises by a considerable amount. Although 
16 
 
the producer surplus falls with the increase in the degree of nationalization, these losses are 
relatively small compared with the gain in consumer surplus. Consequently, total social welfare 
increases slightly, this demonstrates the desirability of nationalizing rail transit operators.  
The numerical results are consistent with the analytical results obtained in previous section 
and can be summarized in Remark1:   
Remark 1: An increase in the level of nationalization causes equilibrium prices to fall for both 
bus and rail transit. Moreover, there is a rise in social welfare when we move away from a standard 
private duopoly (SD) to a mixed duopoly (MD). 
The above remark states that, in the process of nationalization, as the rail transit operator puts 
more weights on consumer surplus relative to its profit, the price competition in the mixed duopoly 
market become fiercer. Since travellers pay less in the move from a standard duopoly (SD) to a 
mixed duopoly (MD), consumer surplus, thereby boosting total public transport demand. Also, 
since the increase in consumer surplus can compensate for the loss of producer surplus, partial 
nationalization is socially preferable in terms of welfare improvement. 
4.2 The effect of nationalization (σ) on equilibria in the long run 
In the long run, since the operator has the ability to adjust its fleet size to match fierce market 
competitions, service frequency might be another strategic device. In this numerical case, we turn 
to Nash price–frequency competition and attempt to demonstrate how the operators respond to the 
progress of nationalization. The numerical equilibrium solutions for this Nash non-cooperative 
game are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3. Effect of Nationalization (σ) on Equilibrium Solutions in the long run 
 σ=0 σ=0.1 σ=0.3 σ=0.5 σ=0.7 σ=0.9 
Bus fare ( Pb ) 1.253 1.221 1.158 1.097 1.038 0.889 
Rail transit Fare ( Pr ) 2.498 2.373 2.091 1.742 1.279 0.611 
Bus frequency ( fb  ) 13.62 13.02 11.58 9.61 6.35 3.53 
Rail Transit frequency ( fr ) 14.96 15.39 16.33 17.46 18.9 19.43 
Market share of bus (Mb) 25.13% 22.50% 16.93% 10.94% 4.37% 0.75% 
Market share of rail transit (Mr ) 74.87% 77.50% 83.07% 89.06% 95.63% 99.25% 
Total public transport Demand (Q*) 5857 5987 6395 6709 7320 8327 
Passenger demand of bus (Qb) 1472 1347 1066 734 320 62 
Passenger demand of rail transit (Qr) 4385 4640 5229 5875 7000 8265 
Producer Surplus (PS) 8735 8553 7993 6976 5022 965 
Δ Profit of bus (πb) 753 600 306 35 -176 -227 
Δ Profit of rail transit ( πr) 7982 7953 7687 6941 5198 1192 
Consumer Surplus (CS) 29287 29933 31472 33542 36599 41637 
Social Welfare (SW) 38022 38489 39465 40518 4162 42602 
As Table 3 shows, the motive of increasing consumer surplus induces rail transit operator 
to increase its frequencies and reduce fares. Since prices are strategic complements in this price-
frequency game, the gradually decreasing rail transit fares provides an incentive to bus operator to 
defend its market share by responding with a fare reduction. On the contrary, in this case with 
17 
 
endogenous frequency, it emerges that service frequencies are strategic substitutes. Thus, 
responding to the increase in rail transit frequency, the bus operator is forced to reduce its service 
frequency to prevent further deterioration of profitability (see Figure 2-a). 
 
Figure 2. The impacts of partial nationalization on equlibria in long run 
In comparison to Case 1, the most likely effect of adding service frequency as another strategic 
variable is that total public transport ridership has been greatly boosted, because the lower 
composite costs resulting from additional competitions over frequency increase the attractiveness 
of public transport. Similarly, when rail operator attaches a high weight to consumer surplus and a 
correspondingly low weight on profit, its market share will be strengthened. Whereas, conventional 
bus services become progressively worse off since its service levels are not as attractive as before. 
The ridership of bus diminishes fast. Then, in the case of full nationalization, a corner solution can 
be obtained in which the rail operator satisfies all demand. As far as operators’ profits are concerned, 
both operators experience financial losses in the process of nationalization. Once the value of σ 
exceeds 0.5, the bus loses the commercial feasibility of operating services due to the negative 
profits. However, the welfare comparisons show that the increase in consumer surplus offsets the 
losses in operators’ profits, which supports the desirability of a mixed oligopoly (see Figure 2-b). 
The main finding of Case 2 is summarized in Remark 2. 
Remark 2: In Nash non-cooperative game, with the motive of increasing consumer surplus (i) the 
rail transit operator intends to reduce fare and increases its service frequency. While, the bus 
operator strategically choose to reduce both fare and frequency.(ii) the increase in consumer 
surplus offsets the losses in producer surplus, leading to the increase of social welfare.  
The studies of mixed duopoly in industrial organization suggests that without other 
regulations, nationalization will heighten social welfare if there are relatively few private firms in 
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the market and will degrade social welfare if there are relatively many private firms, assuming 
Cournot quantity-setting competition with an inelastic and linear demand function (Anderson et al., 
1997; De Fraja and Delbono, 1990). From the above numerical case studies, it can be concluded 
that full nationalization yields the highest level of social welfare in the public transport market. 
Thus, the numerical cases provide support for previous findings on Nash non-cooperative game in 
the context of an elastic and non-linear demand function. 
The above numerical case studies employed a large number of parameters and actual data that 
come from Suzhou area. To test the generalization of these results, a substantial number of 
sensitivity analyses have been carried out with respect to some important demand and cost 
parameters. Not surprisingly, we found that the magnitudes of equilibrium configurations are 
somewhat sensitive (such as fares, service frequencies, demand and welfare elements) to the 
assumed demand parameters (ξ), to variation in the operating costs (ci1) and to the initial demand 
rate (Q�∗). However, the qualitative conclusions derived from the numerical case studies are found 
to be unaffected. All detailed sensitive results are available on request from the authors. 
5 CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper, the duopolistic interactions between one public rail transit operator and one 
private bus operator are presented as a Nash non-cooperative game. To investigate the effects of 
nationalization on equilibrium fares, service frequencies and associated welfare elements, two 
numerical cases based on Suzhou traffic data are analyzed and the main insights are presented as 
follows. Firstly, given the less flexible service frequency in the short run, the presence of one 
publicly-owned rail transit operator is a useful measure for approaching social optima. The more 
weight the rail operator attached to consumer surplus, resulted in the equilibrium fare being lower, 
leading to higher consumer surplus and social welfare. Secondly, in Nash non-cooperative game 
with price and frequency competition, prices are a strategic complement. Due to this, when the rail 
operator reduces (or increases) its fare level, it forces the bus operator to do the same. Meanwhile, 
a marginal frequency increase (decrease) in rail transit service causes bus operator to decrease 
(increase) its frequency, indicating service frequencies are strategic substitutes. Finally, if no 
additional regulations are implemented, nationalizing one rail transit company is socially desirable 
both in Bertrand pricing game in the short-run and in Nash non-cooperative game in the long-run. 
This result is in line with the previous studies' results on mixed oligopolies. That is, when the 
number of private companies is relatively small, privatizing one public firm degrades social welfare.  
The analysis performed in the paper captures the present status of urban public transport 
market in many Chinese cities where newly introduced state-owned rail transit services compete 
with extant private bus companies. Although the analysis was based on a simple model, it has 
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potential applicability in the urban public transport market for analyzing the effectiveness of 
privatization/nationalization. To make the proposed model more application in practice, a new type 
of modeling framework can be developed in the future by integrating the mixed oligopoly 
competition model for supply side with the network equilibrium model in the demand side. Then, 
in addition to mode choices, the travelers' route choices can also be represented by using the 
complementarity formulations of user equilibrium conditions. This complex two-part equilibrium 
model can be solved using standard algorithms with some analytical modeling package such as 
GAMS for example. Additionally, to achieve a more realistic picture, a further extension could be 
to expand the proposed two-link transport system with only one OD pair to complex network with 
diversity of topology, more paths and more stakeholders. The third further extension would be to 
examine the cooperative possibility between bus and rail transit. 
Appendix. Formula Derivations 
1. Equilibrium price in the short run 
Taking the partial derivatives of Equation (15) with respect to fares yields:  
(A.1)                              
i
i
iii
ii
i
P
QcPQ
P
Q
P
OF
∂
∂
−++
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ )( 0
*
δ
ξ
σ                           
Where δ is an indicator variable, which takes on the value of 1 for rail transit and 0 for bus.  
Then, plugging Equations (6) and (7) into (A.1), we can obtain the equilibrium fares by setting 
the corresponding results equal to zero:   
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After some manipulation, the above expression reduces to 
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Next, we examine the effect of nationalization degree (σ) on equilibrium fares. Partially 
differentiating the first order condition in Equation (A.1) for rail transit with respect to its price 
yields:  
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Substituting (7) and ( )1r r r rM P M Mθ∂ ∂ = − into (24), we can rewrite (A.4) as:   
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Because the sign of ( ) rMθ ξ θ− −    and ( )1rM −  is negative, and other items in (A.5) are 
positive, it is easy to prove 2 2 0r iOF P∂ ∂ < .  
Taking the first derivative of (A.1) with respect to nationalization degree, we obtain
2 0r r rOF P Qσ σ∂ ∂ ∂ = − < , and then we get:  
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2. Equilibrium price and frequency in the short run 
Partially differentiating the payoff function of operator i with respect to frequency leads to: 
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Substituting Equations (7) and (A.3) into (A.7) yields the equilibrium frequency for public 
transport service i:  
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Recalling the demand function for public transport service i in Equation (6), we replace 
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3. The effect of nationalization degree on equilibrium demand and welfare 
Analogous to the above propositions, we can analytically explore the effects of nationalization 
degree on equilibrium demand for bus and rail transit: 
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Recalling Equations (7), (8) and (21), we have 0NErQ σ∂ ∂ > and 0NEbQ σ∂ ∂ < . In terms of total 
demand for whole public transport, we take the first derivative of Q* with respect to nationalization 
degree (σ), which yields: 
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Substituting Equations (7), (8) and (18) into (A.12) and rearranging items provides the 
following: 
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4. The effect of nationalization degree on consumer surplus and producer surplus  
Recalling the expression of consumer surplus in (13), since * 0NEQ σ∂ ∂ > , we have
0NECS σ∂ ∂ > .  
The producer surplus can be decomposed into two parts: the part associated with patronage 
and the part related to frequency: 
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Substituting (7) for NE NEr rQ P∂ ∂ and Equation (18) for ( )0NEr rP c− into (A.15) yields:    
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Given 0NErP σ∂ ∂ < , 0NEbP σ∂ ∂ < and 0NEbQ σ∂ ∂ < , it can be easily shown that
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Given the straightforward relationship 1NE NEr bM M+ = and recalling the expressions for 
equilibrium frequencies in Equation (20) yields:    
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Differentiating Equation (A.17) with respect to σ and rearranging the terms yields: 
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After observing * 0NEQ σ∂ ∂ >  and 0NErM σ∂ ∂ > , if the gap in operating costs between rail transit 
and bus is large enough ( 1 1 0NE NEr r b bc M c M− > ), then the sign of (A.18) is positive.  
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Taking both Equations (34) and (36) into account, when the difference in production cost 
between rail transit and bus is large enough, it is certain that producer surplus decreases with an 
increase in the degree of nationalization ( 0iπ σ∂ ∂ <∑ ).  
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